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HEAVENLY FREEDOM AND TWO MODELS OF 
CHARACTER PERFECTION
Robert J. Hartman
Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one 
prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their 
pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary. 
But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their 
character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfec-
tion of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work 
with them in purgatory to perfect their own character. I argue that although both 
models can make sense of all human persons enjoying free will in heaven on var-
ious assumptions, the cooperative model allows all human persons in heaven to 
enjoy a greater degree of freedom. This consideration about the degree of heav-
enly freedom provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model.
According to a prominent family of libertarian views, a person acts 
directly freely if and only if the action was not causally determined, she 
had alternative possibilities at the moment of choice, she had the power 
to choose between those alternatives, and she chose in virtue of exer-
cising that power. Such freedom is what Alvin Plantinga calls “morally 
significant” if and only if at least one choice alternative is morally right 
and at least one is morally wrong.1 The value of morally significant free-
dom lies at least in the way in which it enables a person to have great 
autonomy with respect to making morally right and wrong choices, to be 
seriously morally praiseworthy and blameworthy, to create her own mor-
ally good and bad character in substantial ways, and to make a difference 
to the moral goodness and badness of the world in important respects.2 
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1Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 166.
2See, for example, Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, 81–89; Katherine Rogers, 
Freedom and Self-Creation, 20–25; Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 82–110. 
The modifiers “great,” “serious,” “substantial,” and “important” are meant to highlight that 
it is possible to have these properties in ways that are small, non-serious, insubstantial, and 
far less important via a kind of direct freedom that is not morally significant in Plantinga’s 
sense. See footnote 42.
46 Faith and Philosophy
Many theists appeal to the great value of morally significant freedom as 
at least a partial explanation for why a perfectly good and omnipotent 
God allows evil to occur in creation—namely, God’s goodness leads God 
to give morally significant freedom to human beings but they have mis-
used this gift.3
The value of morally significant freedom and its use in explaining why 
God allows evil, however, become puzzling in view of heaven. Heaven is 
a place or state in which it is impossible to do wrong, and thus no one in 
heaven has morally significant freedom.4 But heaven is also the best pos-
sible place or state for human beings. So, if morally significant freedom is 
such a great good, why does heaven preclude it?5
A plausible response to this puzzle is that human persons can have 
a kind of free will in heaven with value inherited from pre-heavenly 
morally significant free actions.6 Roughly, the idea is that persons 
can enjoy a kind of free will in heaven if (i) their heavenly character 
necessitates their choosing in accordance with the right and the good,7 
(ii) they are morally responsible for having formed that character via 
pre-heavenly free actions and omissions in a foreseeable way, and (iii) 
those previous free actions and omissions involved a choice range 
between morally right and wrong alternatives. So then, because per-
sons in heaven have used their morally significant freedom in the past 
to form the source of their heavenly actions—namely, their perfected 
3Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 166; Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 
82–110.
4Benjamin Matheson suggests that persons in heaven do have morally significant free-
dom. After all, the devil was an angel in heaven who did wrong (see Revelation 12:7–9; Luke 
10:18), which implies that it is possible for some persons in heaven to do wrong. So, why not 
human persons too (see “Tracing and Heavenly Freedom,” 65–67)? The short answer is that 
although there is morally significant freedom for angels in heaven, the good afterlife for res-
urrected human persons does not take place in heaven but on the new earth—a place where 
there is no more “mourning,” “death,” or “pain” for such things have “passed away,” which 
presumably also includes the possibility of wrongdoing (Revelation 21:1–5). There is also a 
corresponding “new heaven” that presumably differs from the old such that angels in the 
new heaven can no longer do wrong (Revelation 21:1). Thus, Matheson’s question is elicited 
by a confusion about the conventional use of “heaven” to refer to what the Bible names the 
“new heaven and earth,” which is a separate state from the one in which the devil did wrong; 
in this paper, I retain the conventional use of “heaven” and thereby sacrifice some biblical 
precision in terminology. All Bible quotations are from the NRSV translation.
5Simon Kittle distinguishes five puzzles about free will in heaven in “Some Problems of 
Heavenly Freedom.”
6See Christopher Brown, “Making the Best Even Better”; Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe, 
“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven”; Pawl and Timpe “Heavenly Freedom”; Pawl 
and Timpe, “Paradise and Growing in Virtue”; James Sennett, “Is There Freedom in Heaven?”; 
Swinburne, “A Theodicy of Heaven and Hell”; Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology.
7This idea is similar to Harry Frankfurt’s concept of “volitional necessity” (“The 
Importance of What We Care About,” 86) and Bernard Williams’s concept of “moral incapac-
ity” (“Moral Incapacity,” 59).
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character—those actions enjoy indirect, inherited, or derived freedom 
and moral praiseworthiness.8
Indirect freedom is genuine freedom. As Timothy O’Connor and 
Christopher Franklin note,9 many philosophers characterize free will as 
a kind of control or “up-to-meness” over choices or actions. These phi-
losophers either identify the kind of control relevant to freedom as the 
same kind of control relevant to being morally responsible for a choice,10 
or, more strongly, they define freedom-relevant control in terms of 
responsibility-relevant control over a choice.11 So, if a person is morally 
responsible for the character that necessitates her choice, the necessitated 
choice is up-to-her in a sense that is either to be identified with a kind of 
free choice—namely, choosing from her own freely made will—or to be 
defined as a free choice of some kind.12 On this analysis, indirect freedom 
comes in degrees.13 A person acts with a greater degree of indirect freedom 
if she has a greater degree of moral responsibility, praiseworthiness, or 
blameworthiness for the character that ensures the action and transfers 
these properties to it.
My aim in this paper is to explore further this view of indirect freedom 
in heaven by examining the way in which character is perfected post-mor-
tem, because at least most human persons do not have perfect character 
at the time of their death. There are two general models of character per-
fection, and each is endorsed in passing by proponents of this account 
of heavenly freedom. On the unilateral model of character perfection, God 
unilaterally, and presumably instantaneously, perfects all that is deficient 
in the character of human persons in their first moments of the afterlife.14 
On the cooperative model of character perfection, God works together with 
human persons by providing them with enabling grace to improve their 
character through their own directly free actions and omissions until it 
becomes perfect, and this process occurs gradually before death and plau-
sibly also after death in purgatory.15 For the purposes of this paper, pur-
gatory is a place of gradual sanctification or good character development, 
8For an account of indirectly free actions, see Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions, 
Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.”
9O’Connor and Franklin, “Free Will.”
10For example, Neil Levy, Hard Luck, 1; Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in 
Life, 1–2; Saul Smilansky, Free Will and Illusion, 16.
11For example, Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck, 17; Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason, 
3–4.
12For dissenting opinions about freedom being transferred in this way, see Matheson, 
“Tracing and Heavenly Freedom,” 61–63; Kittle, “Heavenly Freedom, Derivative Freedom, 
and the Value of Free Choices”; Peter van Inwagen, “When is the Will Free?” 418.
13O’Connor argues that direct freedom also comes in degrees in “Degrees of Freedom.”
14Sennett, “Is There Freedom in Heaven?” 77. On the unilateral model, perhaps 
God brings about full sanctification at the moment just prior to death. For simplicity, I omit 
this possibility.
15Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 411n36.
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and it is not necessarily a place of satisfaction wherein a person receives 
punishment or does penance for past wrongdoing.16
These models appear to have significant implications for which human 
persons can have freedom in heaven and to what degree they can have 
freedom. For example, it at least seems as though a person with overall 
very bad character who accepts God’s invitation to salvation on her death-
bed cannot act indirectly freely in heaven if God unilaterally remedies all 
that is deficient in her character. But if heavenly freedom is a great good 
and heaven is the best place or state for human beings, God would prefer 
a means of character perfection that allows (i) all persons in heaven to 
have free will and (ii) all persons in heaven to have a greater degree of 
freedom, other things being equal. I appeal to these two considerations 
about the universality and degree of heavenly freedom as assessment cri-
teria against which to evaluate models of character perfection.17
In this paper, I argue that, on various assumptions, both the unilateral 
and cooperative models of character perfection can allow for all human 
persons in heaven to enjoy heavenly freedom, including the person in 
the previously mentioned case of deathbed repentance; but I also argue 
that the cooperative model allows all persons in heaven to enjoy a greater 
degree of freedom with respect to their heavenly actions. Thus, we have 
a preliminary reason to think that God would perfect human character in 
the cooperative way.
I would like to qualify this argument in two ways. First, my argument 
merely provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model 
rather than the unilateral model. Such a reason is compatible with the uni-
lateral model’s promoting overall better moral goods for those in heaven 
if there are other and better heavenly goods available or risk-free only on 
the unilateral model. Such a reason is also compatible with the overall best 
model’s being a mixed model, according to which some human persons are 
perfected in the cooperative way and others are perfected in the unilateral 
way. In this latter case, my argument is that God has a preliminary reason to 
16My project is consistent with purgatory as having the single purpose of sanctification 
and as having the dual purpose of sanctification and satisfaction. Given that Protestants may 
be reluctant to accept any form of purgatory, it is worth mentioning that Jerry Walls argues 
that the sanctification version is consistent and consonant with the biblical data, even though 
it is not taught in the Bible (Purgatory, 35–57). Walls also argues that Protestants should accept 
the sanctification version of purgatory for an independent reason concerning personal iden-
tity (Purgatory, 93–122). Additionally, Joshua Thurow argues that Protestants should accept 
a modified satisfaction version of purgatory with respect to repairing our interpersonal rela-
tionships with one another in preparation for heaven (“Atoning in Purgatory”).
17If heavenly freedom is a very great good, persons of young age or with severe disa-
bilities who cannot respond to God’s invitation to salvation in their pre-mortem lives may 
have an opportunity to do so later. Kevin Timpe suggests that such persons may undergo 
development or healing in “limbo” to allow them a broad range of first-time chances to freely 
accept or resist God’s saving grace (“An Argument for Limbo”; for an objection, see David 
Worsley, “Limbo, Hiddenness, and the Beatific Vision”). If such persons are saved in limbo, 
their character can be perfected either unilaterally by God after limbo ends or cooperatively 
in limbo and purgatory.
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choose the cooperative process as the default model of character perfection 
and to employ the unilateral process in special cases. To avoid unnecessary 
complications, I do not consider mixed models. My aim is not to argue for 
an all-things-considered account of character perfection, but to examine the 
way in which considerations about heavenly freedom may impact such an 
account.
Second, my assessment criteria presuppose that heavenly freedom is 
valuable in a way that God would want to promote it, but such a pre-
supposition is contentious for reasons concerning the nature of divine 
freedom as Wes Morriston forcefully argues.18 In particular, God’s perfect 
goodness necessitates that God does what is best. This great-making fea-
ture of God rules out God’s having morally significant freedom, because 
what is best for God to do is never what is morally wrong. But God’s 
lacking morally significant freedom results in a dilemma: either morally 
significant freedom is valuable due to its enabling great moral autonomy, 
moral responsibility, moral self-creation, and moral difference-making in 
the world (but God lacks this perfection), or morally significant freedom 
is not valuable in these ways (and the free will defense fails). Since the 
first horn of the dilemma is a reductio and the second horn contradicts 
my starting point, my claim that indirect freedom in heaven is valuable 
such that God would be concerned to promote it requires there to be a 
way out of Morriston’s dilemma. The reply to which the assumptions in 
this paper commit me is that morally significant freedom is valuable for 
human beings but not for God, and so to deny the claim that God lacks a 
perfection by failing to have morally significant freedom. Other philoso-
phers have filled out such a reply.19 I put this issue aside and assume that 
heavenly freedom is valuable in these ways.20
The Universality Criterion of Heavenly Freedom
Jenny is a person with overall bad character near the time of her death. 
On her deathbed, her friend shares with her the good news of Jesus; Jenny 
repents of her wrongdoing and trusts in Jesus as her Lord and Savior. She 
dies quickly thereafter.
18Morriston, “What Is So Good about Moral Freedom?” and “Is God Free?”
19See O’Connor, “Freedom with a Human Face,” 213; Pawl and Timpe, “Heavenly 
Freedom”; Alexander Pruss, “The Essential Divine-Perfection Objection to the Free-Will 
Defense”; Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 185–205; Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology, 
103–118.
20Some ways out of Morriston’s dilemma conflict with this assumption about the value 
of freedom. For example, Joshua Rasmussen explores the idea that morally significant free 
actions are valuable only because such freedom allows human beings to choose to love God 
without God’s making them do so. If this is the sole value of morally significant freedom, 
we have a plausible explanation for why such freedom is valuable in our pre-mortem lives, 
why such freedom is not valuable in heaven, and why God lacks no perfection in failing to 
have morally significant freedom—namely, God chooses to love human beings without their 
making God do so (“On the Value of Freedom to Do Evil”).
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Suppose that the unilateral model is correct, and that Jenny’s overall 
bad character is unilaterally transformed by God. Jenny thereby loses all 
of her epistemic, affective, or behavioral dispositions toward wrongdoing, 
and she gains character perfections that involve a vast array of true moral 
beliefs, extremely strong dispositions for fitting emotional responses, and 
extremely strong dispositions to act in ways that are good and right. It is, 
then, hard to see how Jenny could act indirectly freely in heaven. That is, 
because Jenny’s perfected character is God’s own doing, it is hard to see 
how her character could transfer freedom and moral responsibility from 
her pre-heaven morally significant free actions to her heavenly actions.
One might think that we can make sense of Jenny’s heavenly free-
dom by pointing to her pre-conversion morally significant free actions. 
Possibly, prior to her repentance, she performed many morally significant 
free actions that contributed in part to the formation of all her heavenly 
virtues that God unilaterally perfects. In this way, Jenny freely forms part 
of her character, and these contributions can themselves be the source of 
her meager indirect freedom in heaven.
But even if it is possible for Jenny to perform pre-conversion morally 
significant free actions and omissions that contribute to her character and 
that partially form her heavenly virtues,21 we can stipulate that these pos-
sibilities are not actualized. Perhaps Jenny is young and lacks the relevant 
opportunities. Or perhaps she had the opportunities, but she misused her 
morally significant freedom in such cases, which implies that she has not 
made the right kind of contribution to her character to add to her heav-
enly virtues. Or perhaps she had the opportunities and used her morally 
significant freedom in the right kinds of ways to contribute to her heav-
enly character, but she was wholly ignorant about the way in which those 
actions formed her character, which precludes her from being morally 
responsible for those parts of her dispositions. Or perhaps she used her 
morally significant freedom in the right way to be morally responsible for 
her contribution to her heavenly character, but she later suffered a kind 
of severe psychic trauma that dislodged and fragmented those character 
traits. Stipulations such as these ensure that this puzzle is not avoided in 
this way.22
The universality of heavenly freedom criterion is that God has a reason to 
prefer a model of character perfection that allows all human persons in 
heaven to enjoy indirect freedom to a model that does not. The unilat-
eral model appears to rule out some people’s having free will in heaven, 
21There is a potential worry for Jenny’s contributing to her heavenly character prior to 
her conversion relating to infused virtues. If the true virtues in heaven are wholly infused by 
God at conversion and are not completed Aristotle-style virtues, Jenny would not be able to 
contribute to her heavenly virtues via her pre-conversion morally significant free actions. See 
Eleonore Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics.”
22One strategy for reply is to insist that this stipulation is illegitimate. Perhaps God is able 
to ensure that every actualized person in Jenny’s condition finds themselves in pre-conver-
sion circumstances in which they freely contribute to their character in the right way.
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because it seems to rule out Jenny’s having free will in heaven. In con-
trast, Jenny’s case is no obstacle for the cooperative model’s allowing all 
persons in heaven to enjoy indirect freedom, because Jenny can perform 
many directly free actions and omissions via divine assistance in purga-
tory that eventually come to form her heavenly virtues. Thus, the uni-
versality criterion appears to provide a reason for God to implement the 
cooperative model rather than the unilateral model.
I contend, however, that the universality criterion does not favor the 
cooperative model in cases such as Jenny’s, because both models can 
make sense of such persons enjoying free will in heaven. In particular, if 
cooperatively perfected virtues can preserve freedom in heaven, the same 
is true for unilaterally perfected virtues on various assumptions, because 
the relevant moral differences between these processes of virtue perfec-
tion is one of degree, not kind. My argument for this conditional claim is 
based on two features these processes share. First, both modes of virtue 
formation partially are gifts, because a person’s acquiring cooperatively 
or unilaterally perfected virtues is not solely her own doing and not solely 
the doing of others.23 Second, in both modes of virtue formation, persons 
can be morally praiseworthy for acquiring the virtues. Clearly, human 
persons are morally praiseworthy for acquiring cooperatively perfected 
virtues via their own directly free actions and omissions, and, obviously, 
unilaterally perfected virtues are gifts from God.
My task is to show that cooperatively perfected virtues are gifts, and 
that human persons are morally praiseworthy for their unilaterally per-
fected virtues.
On the one hand, cooperatively perfected virtues are “gifts” from those 
in our interpersonal relationships and surrounding communities;24 as 
Aristotle claims, we are jointly responsible for our states of character.25 
Our various communities play a large role in our development of moral 
virtues through preliminary moral education and desire habitation; that 
is, they bestow to us a large number of our true moral beliefs and they 
condition our desires away from many bad things and toward many good 
things. Additionally, our communities play a large role in directing our 
aspirations and self-cultivations by offering role models to admire; they 
provide many forward-looking praising and blaming practices to help 
reinforce our commitment to moral norms; and we tend to become like 
the people with whom we have relational union.26 At the very least, our 
communities must not preclude virtue development. Think, for example, 
23One obvious difference is that God is the immediate efficient cause of final virtue on the 
unilateral model but not on the cooperative model. My argument will be that this is a mor-
ally relevant difference only with respect to degree of moral responsibility for virtue—and 
not whether someone is morally responsible for virtue.
24Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 165.
25Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1114b20.
26Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics,” 38; see also 1 Corinthians 
15:33; Proverbs 27:17.
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of communities rearing child soldiers that use fear tactics, moral desensiti-
zation, and addiction to drugs and the pleasures of power to make manip-
ulable soldiers; for many such persons, developing virtue is out of reach.27 
Thus, minimally decent human communities turn out to be something 
close to a necessary condition for virtue cultivation, and at least most of 
our communities provide enormous help in cultivating moral virtues to 
some degree through moral education, desire habituation, role models, 
moral encouragement and reproach, and relational shaping.
Additionally, God provides common grace that inclines all persons 
to develop virtue, for example, by forming in them a conscience and by 
establishing government to restrain human evils;28 and God provides 
special helping grace to develop virtue to those united to God’s self in a 
morally transformative relationship, for example, by relational shaping 
and nudging via the indwelling Holy Spirit.29 Thus, our cooperatively per-
fected virtues are gifts from others due to the way in which we get help 
from them for the raw materials for virtue and throughout the process of 
virtue formation.
On the other hand, human persons can be morally praiseworthy to some 
degree for their unilaterally perfected virtues if divine and human agency 
are both involved in the right way with respect to the human person’s 
coming to faith. This claim requires some background and motivating. 
The background is that apart from God’s enabling grace, human beings 
cannot themselves accept or cease rejecting God’s invitation to salvation; 
such actions and omissions are not among their alternative possibilities. 
But according to theological views consonant with my starting assump-
tions about libertarian freedom, God does provide all human beings with 
prevenient or preparatory grace that expands the option range of their 
libertarian freedom thereby allowing them either to accept God’s saving 
grace or to cease resisting it. So, Jenny’s coming to faith is enabled and 
prompted by God’s grace, but her actually coming to faith must involve 
her own directly free action or omission.30 Human persons, then, can be 
morally praiseworthy to some degree for being in relationship with God, 
because their freely accepting God’s saving grace or ceasing to resist it is 
a morally good state of affairs; and their doing so is difficult owing to the 
strong human propensity to resist love’s relational demands. Analogously, 
an addict is morally praiseworthy for freely surrendering to her family’s 
demands that she quit drinking alcohol, because this movement of her 
27Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, 125; Adams, 
A Theory of Virtue, 163; Hartman, “Moral Luck and the Unfairness of Morality,” 3195.
28Romans 2:13–15, 13:1–7.
29See William Alston, “The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit.”
30It is because God’s grace initiates and enables Jenny’s accepting or not refusing 
God’s saving grace that my claim is not Pelagian as defined by The Council of Orange in 529. 
See Richard Cross, “Anti-Pelagianism and the Resistibility of Grace.”
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free will is morally good, difficult, and contrasts with other worse possible 
movements.
If human persons can be morally praiseworthy to some degree for 
entering into relationship with God, they can be morally praiseworthy 
to some degree for their character perfection if such perfection is a con-
sequence that they could reasonably be expected to foresee in at least its 
general outlines.31 And a person’s character perfection is a foreseeable 
result at least in its general outlines of beginning a morally transforming 
relationship with God. After all, such a relationship can begin only after 
a person feels contrite to some degree about her wrongdoing, repents of 
her wrongdoing at least to some degree, and trusts in God as her Lord 
and Savior to guide her future. By analogy, if a person freely decides to 
take the virtue pill, takes the pill, becomes virtuous, and can reasonably 
be expected to foresee herself becoming so as a result of taking it, she can 
be morally praiseworthy to some degree for becoming virtuous in this 
way.32 Thus, a person can be morally praiseworthy to some degree for her 
unilaterally perfected virtues.
One might object that allowing persons to be praiseworthy to some 
degree for being in a saving relationship with God contravenes Ephesians 
2:8–9 (“For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not 
your own doing; it is the gift of God—not the result of works, so that no 
one may boast”) by providing a ground for pride and boasting.
Two considerations, I  think, defuse this objection. First, there is not 
much to take pride in or boast about for human persons, because most of 
the moral praiseworthiness for a human person’s being in a saving rela-
tionship with God accrues to God’s self. After all, human beings were in 
a dreadful state, human beings cannot themselves fix their horrible state, 
God sacrifices to save them, God gives them enabling grace to respond 
positively to his invitation to salvation, and human beings merely accept 
God’s invitation to salvation or perhaps merely stop resisting God’s grace. 
Second, even if human beings are praiseworthy to some limited degree for 
their being in relationship with God, it may not be permissible for them to 
praise themselves, because there is an ethics of praising the praiseworthy; 
that is, a person’s being praiseworthy is not sufficient for its being per-
missible to praise her. And it seems at least bad if not morally wrong for 
Jenny overtly to praise herself for her own meager contribution, because it 
is ungrateful in light of what God has done. Here is an analogy: Jim slips 
and falls down the side of a cliff onto a slender ledge. Samantha comes 
along with some rope, sends the rope down to Jim, and she pulls him up. 
Subsequently, Jim praises himself for his own life-saving actions; he did, 
31See Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck,” 
1426–1431; cf.  John Martin Fischer and Neal A.  Tognazzini, “The Truth About Tracing”; 
Timpe, “Tracing and the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.”
32Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck,” 
1422–1423.
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after all, hold onto the rope! In praising himself, Jim at least acts badly, 
and perhaps also acts wrongly. The proper private and overt responses 
are gratitude and humility for the salvation primarily brought about 
by others.
If the responses about meager praiseworthiness and the ethics of prais-
ing do not defeat the objection because, for example, the right view of a 
human person’s coming to faith involves only God’s agency, then Jenny 
cannot act indirectly freely in heaven.33 In that case, the universality crite-
rion would favor the cooperative model over the unilateral model if the 
cooperative model can make sense of heavenly freedom for agents who 
are not morally responsible for their being in a morally transformative 
relationship with God. The cooperative model can do so. After all, even if 
a person is not morally responsible in any way for her coming to faith and 
is thereby not morally responsible for the particular parts of her character 
that were unilaterally transformed by God at conversion, she can still per-
form morally significant free actions and omissions in her pre-heaven life 
that are motivated by parts of her character for which she is not morally 
responsible.34 This claim is true in part because it is not the case that a 
person acts directly freely only if she is morally responsible for the char-
acter that explains her action.35 Thus, Jenny can act indirectly freely in 
heaven on the cooperative model even if she is not morally responsible for 
being in a morally transformative relationship with God, because she can 
use her morally significant freedom in post-conversion but pre-heavenly 
opportunities to contribute to her heavenly character. In that case, the uni-
versality criterion would favor the cooperative model.
In summary, if cooperatively perfected virtues can ground indirect free-
dom in heaven, unilaterally perfected virtues can too on various assump-
tions, because both cooperatively and unilaterally perfected virtues are 
gifts to some degree for which human beings are morally praiseworthy to 
some degree. Contrary to appearances, we should not think that the uni-
versality criterion favors the cooperative model over the unilateral model 
in cases such as Jenny’s if agents can be morally praiseworthy to some 
degree for being in a saving relationship with God and that relationship 
foreseeably results in the agent’s character being perfected.
33The same is true, for example, if Jenny is not morally praiseworthy for her perfected 
character due to another reason such as her perfected character was not a foreseeable conse-
quence of entering into a morally transformative relationship with God. This epistemic obsta-
cle is not a problem for developing moral responsibility for character in purgatory on the 
cooperative model, and so this potential problem is uniquely faced by the unilateral model.
34Even on the cooperative model of character perfection, some parts of the agent’s charac-
ter are unilaterally transformed by God; this is the idea from 2 Corinthians 5:17 that a newly 
converted person has become a new creation or has new character that begins the character 
perfection process. Cf. Stump, Atonement, 203–206.
35For arguments on behalf of the partial explanation, see Hartman, “Constitutive 
Moral Luck and Strawson’s Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.”
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The Degree Criterion of Heavenly Freedom
Tammy is someone who trusts Jesus as her Lord and Savior and lives a 
long time before she dies; by God’s enabling grace and her impressive 
moral effort, Tammy makes serious moral progress before death. In this 
way, Tammy performs many pre-mortem morally significant free choices 
that contribute to some great degree to the goodness of her character. 
Thus, Tammy has more greatly contributed to her perfected character via 
morally significant free actions than Jenny has contributed in that way to 
hers. Intuitively, the more a person contributes to her good character via 
exercises of morally significant freedom, the more morally praiseworthy 
she is for her good character and the actions that deterministically result 
from it.36 Thus, strictly based on Tammy and Jenny’s pre-mortem mor-
ally significant free actions, Tammy is far more morally praiseworthy for 
her perfect character than Jenny is for her perfect character. So, if God 
employs the unilateral model of character perfection, Tammy would have 
a much greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven.
The degree of heavenly freedom criterion is that God has a reason to prefer a 
model of character perfection that allows all human persons in heaven to 
have a greater degree of indirect freedom over a model that enables them 
to have a lesser degree. The perfected character of persons in heaven is 
much more of their own doing via pre-heavenly morally significantly free 
choices on the cooperative model than on the unilateral model, because 
the cooperative model allows many more morally significant free actions 
and omissions to have a substantive role in forming the agent’s heav-
enly virtues after death in purgatory, especially in Jenny’s case. Thus, all 
human persons in heaven enjoy a far greater degree of indirect freedom 
on the cooperative model than on the unilateral model, and the degree 
criterion provides a reason to think that God would implement the 
cooperative model.
One might reject the degree criterion as implausible, because one might 
think that acting with a greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven does 
not matter.
But acting with a greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven does mat-
ter given the animating assumption of this paper—namely, that morally 
significant freedom is valuable in our pre-mortem lives at least because it 
enables serious moral autonomy, moral responsibility, and moral self-crea-
tion. These value claims strike many philosophers and theologians as intu-
itively plausible, which partially explains the popularity of the free will 
defense. And if these value claims are true about our pre-heavenly lives, 
36See Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck,” 
1431–1433; Kane, “Three Freedoms, Free Will, and Self-Formation.” It is worth noting that 
Brian Boeninger and Robert Garcia suggest that the kind of resultant moral luck involved in 
heavenly free actions is problematic (“Resting on Your Laurels,” 304–307) and that I argue 
elsewhere that this kind of moral luck is not problematic in general (In Defense of Moral Luck, 
105–111, 124–138).
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they are also true about our lives in heaven, because morality is continuous 
between earth and heaven. Plausibly, the more of these valuable features 
that are appropriated in a person’s will, the better; as Richard Swinburne 
writes, “If responsibility is a good thing, then . . . the more of it the better.”37
One might also doubt that the degree criterion favors the cooperative 
model, because one might think that it is possible for Jenny and Tammy 
to become more morally praiseworthy for their character via directly free 
actions while they are in heaven. In a series of papers, Timothy Pawl and 
Kevin Timpe explicate a view in this neighborhood.38 Put in the termi-
nology of this paper, their view is that persons in heaven act indirectly 
freely when their perfected character for which they are morally respon-
sible determines their action, and persons in heaven act directly freely 
when their perfected character for which they are morally responsible 
precludes wrongdoing but still leaves open various alternative choices.39 
Importantly, such directly free actions are not morally significant, because 
no alternative choice is morally wrong. Even so, they are “morally relevant” 
if and only if some of the alternatives are non-trivially morally better than 
others.40 Morally relevant choices have moral weight in part by improv-
ing heavenly character.41 Whatever the differences in praiseworthiness for 
37Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 97. Additionally, greater indirect freedom 
in heaven is conducive to greater flourishing. For Aquinas, different persons in heaven enjoy 
different degrees of flourishing (Summa Theologiae, I–II 5.2). As Eleonore Stump develops that 
idea, the difference between two morally perfected persons who are enjoying different degrees 
of flourishing in heaven is determined by differences in their willingness, and thus their capac-
ity, to receive God’s love and goodness; neither lacks any goodness that they currently have 
a capacity to receive, because both persons fully flourish relative to their capacities to desire 
God and his goodness (Wandering in Darkness, 390–391). Jenny on the unilateral model would 
not have cultivated as great a capacity to desire God’s love and goodness as Tammy, because 
Tammy has a deeper and closer relationship with God via many more instances of her freely 
willing to experience more of God’s love and goodness. If it is possible to will for more of God’s 
goodness in heaven and thus increase one’s capacity to experience God in heaven, they both 
may ever increase in flourishing; but Tammy may always flourish more.
38Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” “Heavenly 
Freedom,” and “Paradise and Growing in Virtue.”
39Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 408, 410, 414–415.
40Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 416. Additionally, 
Pawl and Timpe assert that the good alternatives are supererogatory. But it is not obvious to 
me that there are moral obligations in heaven, and so I describe their view merely in refer-
ence to good options.
41Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 418; “Paradise and 
Growing in Virtue,” 98. Heavenly character does not improve in the sense of acquiring new 
virtues or acting more on the virtuous mean. It may be improved in the sense of “clinging 
ever tighter to the [virtuous] mean,” because there may be no upper limit for growing in 
their love of the good. This seems right. After all, character just is or supervenes on a per-
son’s thick and stable beliefs and desires in a way that reflects well or badly on the person 
(cf. Christian Miller, Character and Moral Psychology, 24–35). And persons in heaven plausibly 
discover new truths regularly about God and goodness, and thereby often form additional 
true beliefs, that make them love God and goodness even more, and thereby form additional 
good desires; all of these changes reflect well on the person.
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character are between Jenny and Tammy when they enter heaven, such dif-
ferences may eventually be swallowed up by morally relevant free actions 
in heaven that form new character and that generate new direct moral 
praiseworthiness. Thus, if Pawl and Timpe’s basic proposal is plausible 
and if the additional claim that morally relevant free actions generate direct 
moral praiseworthiness is also plausible,42 the degree criterion may not 
favor the cooperative model, because morally relevant free actions would 
generate new moral praiseworthiness for character in heaven that would 
eventually make negligible the moral praiseworthiness for her character 
generated by pre-heavenly morally significant free actions.
But this objection inspired by Pawl and Timpe’s proposal is implausi-
ble, because there are good reasons to think that human persons cannot 
act with morally relevant freedom in heaven. My argument for the claim 
that no human person in heaven exercises morally relevant freedom con-
cerns the nature of the choice options and the nature of perfect character.
Consider a circumstance with various choice options one of which is 
morally best. In that circumstance, a morally perfect person must choose 
the morally best option. After all, better moral character disposes a person 
to choose the better moral option, and so perfect character recommends the 
morally best option; and because perfect character also involves extremely 
strong dispositions to act in ways that are right and good, perfect charac-
ter necessitates choosing the morally best. This reasoning is commonly 
used to support the idea that God’s perfect character necessitates that God 
chooses what is morally best.43 Likewise, human persons in heaven must 
choose the morally best option if they know which option is morally best, 
because their moral character is perfect. If, however, human beings in 
heaven are ignorant of some of the moral properties of their options, they 
42In the case of morally relevant free actions, I find it intuitive that the agent is morally 
praiseworthy for choosing the better option. Although Matheson disagrees (“Tracing and 
Heavenly Freedom,” 63–65), Swinburne agrees (Providence and the Problem of Evil, 84–90). 
One might think that this intuition’s being correct would obviously undermine the value of 
the morally significant freedom and the free will defense. After all, God could have initially 
created a world of human beings with very good character leaving room only for morally rel-
evant free choices between options that are not morally wrong, which would allow them to 
be directly morally praiseworthy to some degree and yet rule out the possibility of choosing 
a morally wrong option. But these claims do not obviously undermine the value of morally 
significant freedom or the free will defense. It is plausible that the degree of an agent’s direct 
moral praiseworthiness for morally relevant free actions would be slight in comparison with 
direct moral praiseworthiness for morally significant free actions. Thus, if God had initially 
created a world of human beings with very good character in this way, there would be pre-
cious little scope for moral autonomy, moral responsibility, moral self-creation, and moral 
difference-making in the world. Perhaps a far more serious scope for all of the valuable 
features is part of a good explanation why for God would confer morally significant freedom 
to human beings.
43See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy, 227; Morriston, “What Is So Good about Moral 
Freedom?” and “Is God Free?”; O’Connor, “Freedom with a Human Face,” 212; William 
Rowe, “Can God Be Free?” 409–410; Swinburne, “The Social Theory of the Trinity,” 427.
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must be inculpably ignorant; and their perfect character would necessitate 
their choosing the option that appears morally best to them.
But that single option set rules out morally relevant freedom. After all, 
morally relevant freedom requires alternative possibilities at the moment 
of choice, and perfect character rules out all of the less-than-best choice 
options as possibilities.
Might there be room for morally relevant freedom in heavenly cir-
cumstances in which there is no non-trivially morally best option? There 
are only two possible kinds of such circumstances, and I contend neither 
offers a plausible occasion to act with morally relevant freedom in heaven.
First, a circumstance provides no non-trivially morally best option if 
all the choice options are exactly equally morally valuable or incommen-
surably morally valuable.44 Plausibly, the same is true for options that are 
trivially unequally morally valuable such that their moral differences are 
so tiny that they generate no qualitatively different reasons in the per-
fectly virtuous agent in comparison with exactly equally morally valuable 
options. For each of these sets of options, a heavenly person’s virtuous 
reasons leave open which of those choices to make, and thereby create an 
opportunity to exercise direct freedom.
But those sets of options also rule out morally relevant freedom, because 
no alternative possibility is non-trivially morally better than another and 
morally relevant freedom requires that at least one option is non-trivially 
morally better than another.45
Second, a circumstance provides no non-trivially morally best choice 
option if there is an infinite number of morally good alternatives to choose 
between, and, for any good option, there is a non-trivially morally better 
one. Such circumstances satisfy the basic constraints for exercising morally 
relevant freedom in heaven, because there is more than one alternative 
possibility at the moment of choice and at least one of those alternative 
possibilities is non-trivially morally better than another. Plausibly, a per-
fectly virtuous person could choose a morally inferior option in such a 
44It is not possible for persons in heaven to have an option set in which there is no non-triv-
ially morally best option but where some are better than others. For example, suppose there 
is an apparent option range (i)–(iii) where (i) and (ii) are equally morally valuable, and each 
is better than (iii). According to this set up, a person with perfect character must choose (i) or 
(ii), and so (iii) is not a genuine option.
45This stage of my argument crucially relies on the interpretation of Pawl and Timpe as 
measuring the moral goodness of actions under a single hierarchy. But what if we under-
stand morally relevant actions as choosing between options that are morally incommensu-
rable due to their developing different kinds of goodness? In that case, one option would be 
morally better in some way than another. I thank Tim Pawl and Mark Murphy for pressing 
this alternative interpretation. Nevertheless, this alternative interpretation offers no help for 
acquiring direct moral praiseworthiness in heaven, because a person is not directly morally 
praiseworthy for a choice between overall incommensurably good options in the case that 
their character requires that they must choose between only those options. Of course, such a 
person could be indirectly morally praiseworthy for choosing one of these incommensurable 
good options if she is morally praiseworthy for the character that limits her choice range in 
this way. See footnote 42 for a related point.
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case, because all choices in this circumstance necessarily have that com-
parative property.46
But it seems plausible that human persons cannot find themselves in a 
heavenly circumstance with an infinite number of choice options at a par-
ticular time. After all, pre-mortem human persons are in material conditions 
that limit their options to a finite set and their volitional capacities afford 
them the ability to do only a finite number of things. Plausibly, the same is 
true for morally perfected human persons in heaven, because such persons 
enjoy an embodied mode of existence in the afterlife on the new earth,47 and, 
plausibly, they do not leave behind their finite volitional capacities.
One might object that human beings in heaven do at least have infinite 
lifespans, and so it is possible for them to have a diachronic infinite option 
set, according to which an infinite number of choice options are staggered 
over time and increase in value.48 Suppose, for example, there is a bottle of 
wine that gets better each day ad infinitum,49 and breaking open this bottle 
with friends in heaven increases in moral value each day due to the better 
quality of hospitality it provides for guests. The option set, then, would 
include the following directly free choices: (i) to open the bottle today, (ii) 
to open the bottle tomorrow, or (n) to open the bottle tomorrow + n.50 In 
the case of a directly free choice made today to open the bottle on a future 
day such as (ii), the future action would be ensured or necessitated in such 
a way as to count as an indirectly free action.
But there is a separate reason related to finitude about why human 
beings in heaven cannot have an infinite number of choice options. 
Plausibly, the infinity of possibilities would not be cognizable at a par-
ticular time, because pre-mortem and heavenly human persons have only 
finite and limited cognitive capacities. So, only a finite cognizable num-
ber of options would remain. As such, the person in heaven would have 
only a finite set of options to exercise direct freedom, because options to 
exercise direct freedom are limited to the possibilities that are presented 
by her intellect to the will. But then, given the options that her intellect 
presents to her will at a particular time, her perfect character must lead 
her to choose to open the bottle of wine on the day that is most morally 
valuable of all the days presently cognized, or to choose to exercise her 
intellect further to expand her option range. Plausibly, it would be best at 
some point to directly freely choose to open the bottle on a particular day 
rather than to further exercise her cognitive powers, because it is better to 
46Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a 
Surpassable World.”
47See 1 Corinthians 15; Revelation 21–22.
48I owe this objection to Mark Murphy.
49John Pollock, “How Do You Maximize Expected Value?” 417.
50An irrelevant option construal is between (i) opening the bottle today or (ii) saving the 
bottle for another day, because this is a potentially infinite series of finite sets of options. 
By directly freely choosing (ii) today, I get a new option set tomorrow, again, between (i) 
and (ii).
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open the bottle at some point rather than never to open the bottle at all; 
and any day on which she chooses to open the bottle necessarily has the 
property of being morally inferior to some future day. For these reasons, 
the heavenly person would not be flummoxed by such a choice. Therefore, 
if the intellectual powers of perfected human persons remain finite, the 
diachronically infinite set of possibilities provides no occasion for morally 
relevant freedom either.51
In summary, it is implausible that people act with morally relevant free-
dom in heaven. Heavenly circumstances offer only sets of options either 
with finite members or finite cognizable members at a particular time. If 
there is a unique non-trivially morally best alternative among the finite 
option set, the perfected person must choose that option, and so lacks alter-
native possibilities and thereby lacks morally relevant freedom. If there is 
no unique non-trivially morally best alternative among the finite option 
set, all the choice options are exactly equally morally valuable, trivially 
unequally morally valuable, or incommensurably morally valuable, but 
no such option is non-trivially morally better than another, which rules 
out morally relevant freedom. Thus, perfected human beings in heaven 
cannot act with morally relevant freedom.
This argument has a constructive implication about the nature of moral 
praiseworthiness for heavenly free actions. All heavenly actions either are 
indirectly free choices determined by perfect character or are directly free 
choices made between options that are equally morally valuable, trivi-
ally unequally morally valuable, or incommensurably morally valuable. 
Indirectly free choices in heaven do not generate new direct moral praise-
worthiness, and directly free choices in heaven made between option sets 
of those three kinds plausibly do not generate new direct moral praisewor-
thiness either. Thus, all moral praiseworthiness for a person’s indirectly 
and directly free actions in heaven is inherited from her pre-heavenly 
morally significant and relevant free actions.
Therefore, both objections to the claim that the degree criterion favors 
the cooperative model are defeated. And since there are no other obvious 
objections to that claim, I  conclude that the degree criterion favors the 
cooperative model of character perfection.
Conclusion
I assessed two models of character perfection based on the idea that God 
would want to promote free will in heaven. Although the universality 
criterion appeared to support the cooperative model over the unilateral 
model in cases such as Jenny’s, I argued that this appearance is mislead-
ing; both models can make sense of the idea that all human persons in 
heaven possess indirect freedom if agents can be praiseworthy for being in 
51My argument is compatible with Swinburne’s plausible speculation that the redeemed 
in heaven have “much increased” cognitive and volitional capacities (Responsibility and 
Atonement, 190). My argument requires only that these capacities remain finite.
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a saving relationship with God and their character perfection is a foreseea-
ble consequence of beginning such a morally transformative relationship. 
(If I am wrong that human persons are praiseworthy for entering into a 
morally transformative relationship with God or that character perfection 
is a foreseeable result of being in that kind of relationship, the univer-
sality criterion does favor the cooperative model.) Subsequently, I argued 
that the degree criterion supports the cooperative model over the unilat-
eral model, because it allows all persons—and especially persons such 
as Jenny—to enjoy a greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven. Thus, 
assuming that heavenly freedom is valuable in a way that God would be 
concerned to promote it, we have a reason to think that God would perfect 
human character according to the cooperative model.
Two constructive claims about the afterlife follow. First, all moral praise-
worthiness for heavenly actions derive from pre-heavenly morally signifi-
cant and relevant free actions. Second, the cooperative model requires that 
the character perfection process continues after death, and so my argument 
provides a reason to affirm purgatory as a place of character development.
These considerations about heavenly freedom offered in support of 
the cooperative model are not decisive on their own, even apart from my 
undefended assumption about the value of heavenly freedom. Heavenly 
freedom is merely one kind of good that God would take into account 
when deciding between models of character perfection. Perhaps alter-
native goods are available or risk-free only on the unilateral model, and 
such goods may make the unilateral model morally preferable overall;52 or 
perhaps an all-things-considered assessment of heavenly goods favors a 
mixed model. In this way, my argument is not a decisive argument for an 
unmixed cooperative model; it just provides a reason in favor of thinking 
that God would want to perfect the character of redeemed persons in the 
cooperative way, other things being equal.53
Stockholm University
52For example, salvation secured in the pre-mortem life becomes risky to some degree 
on the cooperative model if persons in purgatory can defect from their saving relationship 
with God (Green, “The Jet Leg Theory of Purgatory,” 153–154; cf. Walls, Purgatory, 147–149). 
It is also logically possible that a person remains forever in purgatory; I thank Mark Murphy 
for that related point. One might think that such considerations are sufficient to condemn 
the cooperative model. But they are not, because there are other points of which we should 
take stock. For example, if personal identity cannot survive the dramatic transformation in 
character on the unilateral model, no merely human person who is saved makes it to heaven 
on the unilateral model, which would be a compelling argument for the cooperative model 
despite the previously mentioned risks (cf. Walls, Purgatory, 93–122).
53I am indebted to Ray Baker, William Bülow, Everett Fulmer, Hillary Hartman, Ben 
Matheson, Tim Pawl, and David Worsley as well as to Mark Murphy and two anonymous 
referees for comments on some version of this paper. I am also grateful for comments and 
objections from audiences at the 2020 Helsinki Analytic Theology Workshop at the University 
of Helsinki, the 2020 Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, and 
the 2020 meeting of the St. Benedict Society for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical 
Theology at the University of York.
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